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REAL PROPERTY ATTACHMENT-PROPERTY OR ECONOMIC INTEREST?-
Hansen v. Weyerhaeuser Co. (In re Northwest Homes, Inc.), 526
F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976).
In late 1971 the Weyerhaeuser Company initiated a lawsuit against
Northwest Homes of Chehalis, Inc., for goods sold and delivered. To
ensure satisfaction of any subsequent judgment, Weyerhaeuser ob-
tained liens against the defendant's real property pursuant to the
Washington attachment statute.1 Northwest Homes received neither
notice nor an opportunity to be heard prior to the attachment. 2 Han-
sen, appointed receiver in Northwest's subsequent bankruptcy, applied
for an order invalidating the attachment. In December 1972 the ref-
eree declared the Washington attachment statute unconstitutional
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution and under article I, section 3, of the Wash-
ington Constitution, for failure to provide the defendant with notice
and an opportunity to be heard prior to issuance of the writ.3 On ap-
peal, the federal district court adopted the memorandum opinion of
the referee. 4
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Held: The
nonpossessory lien did "nothing more than impinge upon economic
interests of the property owner,"'5 and therefore the attachment stat-
ute, as applied, did not deprive the defendant of a property interest in
1. 'WAsH. REV. CODE ch. 7.12 (1976). Weyerhaeuser apparently complied with all
statutory requirements for valid attachment, as Northwest Homes never challenged it
on grounds of noncompliance.
2. The attachment statute does not require that the defendant-debtor be notified or
be permitted an opportunity to be heard prior to attachment of the property. See id.
3. The memorandum opinion of the referee is repeated in full in the district court
opinion. See In re Northwest Homes, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 725 (W.D. Wash. 1973). The
referee based his conclusion under the federal constitution on Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See text
accompanying notes 23-26 infra.
The attachment procedures were also held invalid under article I, section 3, of the
Washington Constitution, the language of which duplicates the federal due process
clause: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." The referee relied upon Lucas v. Stapp, 6 Wn. App. 971, 497 P.2d 250 (1972)
(prejudgment seizure presented commonplace rather than "extraordinary" situation,
so that summary seizure was not justified), and Seattle Credit Bureau v. Hibbitt, 7 Wn.
App. 219, 499 P.2d 92 (1972) (following Lucas).
4. In re Northwest Homes, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 725 (W.D. Wash. 1973).
5. Hansen v. Weyerhaeuser Co. (In re Northwest Homes, Inc.), 526 F.2d 505, 506
(9th Cir. 1975) (quoting Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 997,
999 (D. Ariz. 1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 901 (1974)).
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violation of due process. Further, the court found that the defendant's
due process rights were fully satisfied by the statutory post-attachment
hearing at which the creditor would be required to demonstrate that
the writ was properly and regularly issued." Hansen v. Weyerhaeuser
Co. (In re Northwest Homes, Inc.), 526 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976).
Since the landmark decision of the Supreme Court in Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp.,7 summary prejudgment creditor remedies8
have been subjected to increasing constitutional scrutiny. Sniadach
and its progeny have established that the temporary seizure of a debt-
or's personal property by provisional writ constitutes a taking of a pro-
tected property interest under the due process clause, thus entitling the
debtor to notice and an opportunity to be heard or other procedural
safeguards against mistaken deprivation. This note examines the cur-
sory reasoning in the Hansen decision that these procedural guaran-
tees do not apply to the attachment of real property because such at-
tachment affects only economic interests of the debtor rather than
property interests protected by the due process clause. It also critically
discusses the court's conclusion that the post-attachment hearing pro-
vided by the Washington attachment statute compares favorably with
the statutory postseizure hearing that the United States Supreme Court
sustained in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.9 The note concludes that the
Washington attachment statute fails to meet the minimal due process
guarantees endorsed in Mitchell, which-if applied to real property
attachment-would minimize the possibility of mistaken or arbitrary
attachment without defeating the interest of the creditor in the prop-
erty attached.
I. THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS IN
PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
A. An Overview of Procedural Due Process and Property Rights
The constitutional guarantee of procedural due process applies to
6. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.12.270 (1976).
7. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
8. "Summary" and "ex parte" are used herein to mean procedures initiated without
notice and a prior hearing of the type required by Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.. 395
U.S. 337 (1969), and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See Part I-A infra.
9. 416U.S. 600(1974).
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governmental deprivation of life, liberty, or property. It requires that
any deprivation of a protected property interest be accompanied by
minimum procedural safeguards, including some form of notice and
hearing.' 0 Once the existence of a property interest is established,
courts traditionally utilize a balancing approach to the due process
issue, weighing the government's interest in summary procedures
against the individual's interest in procedural guarantees against mis-
taken or arbitrary deprivation." If the individual's interest is deemed
paramount, he or she must be accorded procedural guarantees-
usually timely and adequate notice of the action and an effective
chance for defense-before any "taking" of the property in question.' 2
10. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver entitled to notice and
hearing before revocation of driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(welfare recipients have property interest in welfare benefits entitling them to notice
and hearing before benefit termination); Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223
(1863) (nonresident creditor with protected property interest in results of bankruptcy
proceeding not bound by discharge in bankruptcy under state law when he had neither
been notified nor participated in the proceeding). The theory is that no state action
should work to the detriment of- an individual's interest in life, liberty, or property
without giving the individual notice and an opportunity to be heard. Essential to any
legal system that stresses resolution of disputes through advocacy is a fair, full, and
open contest between the adversaries. Contrary to those interests is any state action
involving the determination of a protected interest in an ex parte proceeding. See
Newton, Fuentes "Repossessed" Reconsidered, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 497, 503 (1976).
11. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951), outlined a number of considerations relevant to the
due process balancing test:
The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the manner in
which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives to the pro-
cedure that was followed, the protection implicit in the office of the functionary
whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt complained of and good ac-
complished-these are some of the considerations that must enter into the judicial
judgment.
Id. at 163. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court balanced the re-
cipient's interest in retaining necessary welfare benefits against the government's in-
terest in summary termination to avoid revenue loss to ineligible recipients and sus-
tained the private interest. In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), the Court found
that the private interest of a driver in preventing summary revocation of his driver's
license outweighs the competing state interest in protecting a claimant from the possi-
bility of an unrecoverable judgment.
Where it has been essential to satisfy state needs immediately, postponement of
notice and hearing until after the taking of the property has not been considered a
denial of due process. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950)
(summary seizure of misbranded articles permissible); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283
U.S. 589 (1931) (notice and hearing postponed to ensure prompt collection of in-
ternal revenue).
12. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (revocation of driver's license);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits); Coe v.
Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413 (1915) (imposing liability on stockholders
for unpaid stock subscription held by them); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274 (1876)
(encumbering title to real property). Although an individual may be entitled to pro-
cedural guarantees, the form of these guarantees varies with the nature of the interests
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B. Due Process and Prejudgment Attachment of Personal Property
Attachment is a provisional remedy,' 3 ancillary to the main action
in which the creditor tries to establish a claim against the debtor. 14 In
Washington, to obtain a writ of attachment, the creditor must institute
a suit seeking judgment on the underlying debt,1 5 file an affidavit spec-
ifying the amount of the debt,16 post a bond for double the amount
claimed,' 7 pledge that the attachment is sought in good faith,1 8 and
list any of ten statutory grounds for attachment.1 9 A writ will then be
involved. In Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy. 367 U.S.
886 (1961), the Court stated that due process of law does not invariably require a
hearing:
The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures uni-
versally applicable to every imaginable situation ...
[C] onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any
given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature
of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has
been affected by governmental action.
Id. at 895.
13. A provisional remedy is generally defined as one "provided for present need
or ... to meet a particular exigency. Particularly, a temporary process available to a
plaintiff in a civil action, which secures him against loss, irreparable injury, dissipa-
tion of the property, etc., while the action is pending." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1389(4th ed. 1968). Its principal purpose is to permit seizure of a debtor's assets pending
adjudication of an underlying claim. In addition to prejudgment garnishment, attach-
ment, and replevin, most states have statutory provisions granting possessory liens to
landlords, innkeepers, repairmen, warehousemen, and others, which permit them to
retain goods in their custody pending payment for services rendered. See Scott, Con-
stitutional Regulation of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The Cost of Procedural Due
Process, 61 VA. L. REV. 807 (1975).
14. See generally S. MORGANSTERN, LEGAL PROTECTION IN GARNISHMENT AND
ATTACHMENT (1971). A creditor may utilize attachment for a variety of purposes,
the most common of which are as follows: (I) To furnish security for the satisfaction
of any judgment the creditor may obtain by preventing the debtor from evading the
claim through disposition, destruction, or removal of the property; (2) to obtain
leverage over the debtor so that he will be less likely to defend the principal suit; or(3) to gain quasi in rem jurisdiction over the defendant. See 48 WASH. L. REV. 646.
648 (1973).
15. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.12.010 (1976).
16. Id. § 7.12.020.
17. Id. § 7.12.060. See note 84 infra.
18. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.12,020 (1976).
19. Id. § 7.12.020. The ten grounds for attachment are as follows:
(1) That the defendant is a foreign corporation; or
(2) That the defendant is not a resident of this state; or(3) That the defendant conceals himself so that the ordinary process of law can-
not be served upon him; or
(4) That the defendant has absconded or absented himself from his usual place
of abode in this state, so that the ordinary process of law cannot be served upon
him; or
(5) That the defendant has removed or is about to remove any of his property
from this state, with intent to delay or defraud his creditors; or(6) That the defendant has assigned, secreted, or disposed of. or is about to assign.
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issued directing the sheriff to seize property of the debtor.20 Attach-
ment in Washington is thus an entirely ex parte proceeding.21 The
creditor is not obligated to notify the debtor or to permit him or her
an opportunity to challenge the validity of the writ prior to issuance.
Recently this kind of prejudgment creditor remedy has been sub-
jected to intensive constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court tradi-
tionally had held that due process was satisfied if the debtor was af-
forded notice and an opportunity for a hearing at a trial on the merits
of the underlying claim.22 In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,23
however, the Supreme Court ruled that the temporary deprivation of
the use and possession of wages in a garnishment action was a depri-
vation of a protected property interest and that due process require-
ments could be satisfied only by notice and an opportunity to be heard
prior to the garnishment. Sniadach established that even a brief taking
secrete, or dispose of, any of his property, with intent to delay or defraud his
creditors; or
(7) That the defendant is about to convert his property, or a part thereof, into
money, for the purpose of placing it beyond the reach of his creditors; or
(8) That the defendant has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or in-
curring the obligation for which the action is brought; or
(9) That the damages for which the action is brought are for injuries arising from
the commission of some felony; or
(10) That the object for which the action is brought is to recover on a contract,
express or implied.
Id. If these requirements are satisfied, the court clerk must issue a writ of attachment.
Id.
20. Id. §§ 7.12.090, .130.
21. See note 8 supra.
22. See McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929) (mem.), aff'g 127 Me. 110,
141 A. 699 (1928). The state court held that the temporary deprivation imposed by
Maine's summary attachment statute was not unconstitutional because it did not in-
volve the taking of a property interest contemplated by the fourteenth amendment.
The court stated that even if it had involved such a taking, it was not a deprivation
without due process of law, "for it is a part of a process, which during its proceeding
gives notice and opportunity for hearing and judgment of some judicial or other
authorized tribunal." 141 A. at 702-03. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed.
See also Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256
U.S. 94 (1921).
23. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). The Court recognized that summary procedures may
well meet the requirements of due process in extraordinary situations, but found that
the instant circumstances justified no such special protection to the state or creditor.
The majority's ambiguous references to the specialized nature of property in wages,
including the particular hardship imposed on debtors and the vast leverage gained by
creditors, led some lower courts to conclude that Sniadach was limited to prejudgment
seizures of wages or other "necessities." See Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d
100 (10th Cir. 1970); Termplan Inc. v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68
(1969). See also 54 MINN. L. REV. 853, 860 (1970). Other courts rejected any such
distinction. See Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Randone v.
Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied,
407 U.S. 924 (1972); Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969).
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or deprival of the use of property may be within the ambit of due pro-
cess.2 4 Three years later, the Supreme Court expanded this rule in
Fuentes v. Shevin,25 invalidating Pennsylvania and Florida replevin
procedures for failure to afford notice and an opportunity to be heard
prior to replevin of the debtor's property. The significance of Fuentes
was that absent "extraordinary situations" the state could not partici-
pate in any prejudgment process involving the taking of an individu-
al's property without prior notice and a hearing. 26
Subsequently the Court in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.27 aban-
doned any absolute requirement of prior notice and an opportunity to
be heard, holding as a general proposition that there must be a bal-
ancing of the conflicting debtor and creditor interests. Employing this
balancing approach, the Court determined that the procedural safe-
guards provided by the challenged Louisiana sequestration statute
complied with due process despite the absence of any provision for
notice or hearing prior to issuance of the writ. 28 Most recently, in
24. Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, stated:
The "property" of which petitioner has been deprived is the use of the garnished
portion of her wages during the interim period between the garnishment and the
culmination of the main suit. Since this deprivation cannot be characterized as
de minimis, she must be accorded the usual requisites of procedural due process:
notice and a prior hearing.
395 U.S. at 342 (emphasis in original).
25. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
26. See Newton, supra note 10, at 498. Under the Fuentes scheme. "extraordinary
situations" justify summary procedures only if (1) an important governmental or
general public interest is at stake. (2) there is a special need for very prompt action.
and (3) the state exerts strict control over its use of legitimate force. 407 U.S. at 91.
The purpose of the "extraordinary situations" exception was to confine summary seizure
to a fairly narrow realm. "[The] exception was couched in terms that placed the
burden on the government or the creditor to demonstrate the necessity for bypassing
the ordinary due process guarantees of prior notice and a hearing." Pearson. Due
Process and the Debtor: The Impact of Mitchell v. W.T. Grant (pt. 1), 28 OKLA. L.
REV. 743. 751 (1975).
27. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
28. Justice White, in his majority opinion, pointed out that the requirements of
due process " 'are not technical'" and do not guarantee any "'particular form of
procedure."' Id. at 610 (quoting Inland Empire Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697(1945)). The Louisiana sequestration statute imposed a lien on personal property
purchased on an installment contract. That lien could be defeated by the buyer's sub-
sequent transfer of possession of the property. Thus, the Mitchell opinion posed the
issue in terms of two parties with concurrent interests where the failure of the state
to act might result in loss of the creditor's interest. This characterization suggests that
the failure of the state to act might itself result in a type of due process deprivation.
See Newton, supra note 10, at 504.
The Court gave the following five justifications for postponing the debtor's oppor-
tunity for a hearing: (1) The need to protect the seller's security interest in view of
the steadily decreasing value of the property while in the buyer's possession: (2) the
possibility that the debtor might conceal, alienate, destroy, or otherwise abrogate the
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North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.29 the Court applied
the Mitchell analysis to invalidate Georgia's garnishment statute. Be-
cause the official seizures were carried out without prior notice, op-
portunity for a hearing, or other procedural guarantees against mis-
taken deprivation, the Court concluded that they failed to satisfy due
process.30
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has clearly abandoned the tradi-
tional rule permitting ex parte seizure of personal property. Sniadach
and its progeny established that statutes authorizing prejudgment sei-
zure which afford neither prior notice and a hearing nor satisfactory
alternatives fail to meet the minimum requisites of the fourteenth
amendment.31
C. Due Process and Prejudgment Attachment of Real Property
A creditor who undertakes to attach realty must comply with the
same procedures that are applicable to personalty.3 2 Real property is
seller's interest; (3) the reliability of an ex parte determination when issues are
capable of documentary proof; (4) the due process requirement that the conflicting
interests of the creditor and debtor be balanced; and (5) the ability to have an im-
mediate full hearing on the matter of possession following execution of the writ. 416
U.S. at 607-10. For further discussion of the Mitchell doctrine, see Part III infra.
29. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
30. The Court noted the following three particular ways in which the garnishment
statute failed to meet the due process requirements of Mitchell: (1) A clerk rather
than a judge supervised the writ-issuing process; (2) the postseizure hearing was
inadequate as it did not reach the merits of the creditor's underlying claim; and (3) the
creditor was required to document the indebtedness in a merely conclusory fashion.
Id. at 607.
3 1. Since Sniadach the Washington courts have been confronted with several cases
challenging the state's summary attachment and garnishment provisions on due process
grounds. In Olympic Forest Prods., Inc. v. Chaussee Corp., 82 Wn. 2d 418, 511 P.2d
1002 (1973), the supreme court read Fuentes broadly and held that a bank account
is a significant property interest that cannot be garnished without the due process
guarantees of prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. The court stated that the
business background of the debtor was pertinent only to questions of waiver or the
form of the hearing, not the right of the debtor to the hearing itself. In Rogoski v.
Hammond, 9 Wn. App. 500, 513 P.2d 285 (1973), the plaintiff-landlord brought an
action for unpaid rent and obtained an order directing the tenant to show cause why
a writ of attachment should not issue. The court held that the attachment of personal
property must be preceded by adequate notice and hearing. After extensive discussion
of the nature and content of any preseizure hearing, the court concluded that the
show cause proceeding in the instant case failed to meet the necessary requirements.
In Lucas v. Stapp, 6 Wn. App. 971, 497 P.2d 250 (1972), the court of appeals held
an attachment of personalty without prior notice and hearing to be unconstitutional
under Sniadach. Accord, Seattle Credit Bureau v. Hibbitt, 7 Wn. App. 219, 499 P.2d
92 (1972) (relying on Fuentes). All of these decisions preceded Mitchell.
32. See generally WASH. REV. CODE ch. 7.12 (1976).
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not attached by seizure, however, but by filing with the county auditor
a copy of the writ together with a description of the property at-
tached. 33 The attachment operates as a lien preventing the property
owner from conveying clear title. It puts any potential purchaser on
notice and preserves the creditor's right to have the real estate sold in
execution as against any subsequent taker. 34 The attachment remains
a cloud on the debtor's title until discharge of the debt, his success on
the merits, or judicial satisfaction of the creditor's claim. 35
Because the Court's decisions from Sniadach to Di-Chem involved
the summary seizure of personal property, lower courts confronted
with a due process challenge to summary procedures involving real
property have encountered a threshold question: Although the debtor
is not deprived of "possession" of the attached real estate, does the
lien nevertheless deprive the debtor of a property interest protected by
the fourteenth amendment?
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue, it
has indicated that a "property interest" should be broadly construed in
the context of prejudgment creditor remedies. Justice Harlan, concur-
ring in Sniadach, stated that due process protections apply to an inter-
ference with the "unrestricted use" of the property as well as with pos-
session. 36 In Fuentes the Court refused to confine the scope of Snia-
dach and extended due process guarantees to all forms of chattel
property without respect to distinctions based on type, use, hardship,
or length of deprivation.37 The relative weight of the property interest
33. See id. § 7.12.130.
34. See id. §§ 7.12.170, .210, Cf. Zittman v. McGrath. 341 U.S. 446 (1952)
(personal property).
35. For the manner in which the sheriff must dispose of the attached property to
satisfy the underlying judgment, see WASH. REV. CODE § 7.12.210 (1976). At any
time prior to judgment on the underlying suit, the defendant may post bond to the
plaintiff to the effect that he will perform the judgment of the court, and the attach-
ment will be discharged. Id. § 7.12.250. The defendant may also move to have the
writ dissolved on grounds that it was improperly or irregularly issued. Id. § 7.12.270.
For discussion of this post-attachment hearing provision, see Part 111-A infra.
36. "[D] ue process is afforded only by the kinds of 'notice' and 'hearing' which
are aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity, of the under-
lying claim against the alleged debtor before he can be deprived of his property or its
unrestricted use." 395 U.S. at 343 (Harlan, J., concurring) (former emphasis in
original; latter emphasis added).
37. The Court stated: "The Fourteenth Amendment draws no bright lines around
three-day, 10-day or 50-day deprivations of property." 407 U.S. at 86. The Court also
noted:
No doubt, there may be many gradations in the "importance" or "necessity" of
various consumer goods. Stoves could be compared to television sets, or beds
could be compared to tables. But if the root principle of procedural due process
774
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has been deemed relevant to the form of notice and hearing accorded,
but not decisive of the basic right to due process protection.38 Finally
the Court in Di-Chem declined to limit its definition of protected
property interests, eschewing any constitutional distinction between
commercial and consumer garnishment.39
Relying upon the Court's expansive definition of "property," a
number of lower courts have found that the lien imposed by real prop-
erty attachment constitutes a taking of a protected property interest
cognizable under the due process clause.40 These courts have refused
to hold that an actual seizure is necessary to invalidate summary at-
tachment procedures. Other courts, focusing on the Supreme Court's
emphasis on the "use and possession" of which the personal property
is to be applied with objectivity, it cannot rest on such distinctions. The Fourteenth
Amendment speaks of "property" generally. And, under our free-enterprise sys-
tem, an individual's choices in the marketplace are respected, however unwise
they may seem to someone else. It is not the business of a court adjudicating due
process rights to make its own critical evaluation of these choices and protect
only the ones that, by its own lights, are "necessary."
Id. at 90-91.
38. Id. at 86, 90 n.21. The Court again indicated that outright seizure is not the
only kind of deprivation that must be preceded by notice and a hearing. Id. at 91 n.23.
39. In refusing to make any distinction based on the status of the debtor, the
Court stated: "We are no more inclined now than we have been in the past to dis-
tinguish among different kinds of property in applying the Due Process Clause."
419 U.S. at 608. This view is consistent with other statements of the Court regarding
the scope of the fourteenth amendment protection of "property." It is the nature of
the property interest affected that is pertinent to due process, rather than considera-
tions of "hardship," "necessity," or "importance." In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972), the Court stated that "to determine whether due process require-
ments apply in the first place, we must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of
the interest at stake." Id. at 570-71 (emphasis in original).
40. These courts have emphasized that a real property attachment restricts sale,
affects mortgage value and mortgageability, and decreases the owner's equity to the
extent of the lien. See, e.g., Terranova v. AVCO Financial Servs., 396 F. Supp. 1402
(D. Vt. 1975); Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n v. PPG Indus., Inc.,
365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973); Clement v. Four North State Street Corp., 360
F. Supp. 933 (D.N.H. 1973). In each case the federal district court struck down on
due process grounds a state statute permitting summary prejudgment attachment of
real property.
One case challenging ex parte real property attachment on due process grounds has
reached the Washington Supreme Court. In Thompson v. DeHart, 84 Wn. 2d 931,
530 P.2d 272 (1975), the court found constitutional an attachment of real property
which met the three-pronged test of Fuentes for an "extraordinary situation." See note
26 supra. The court stated:
First, the attachment of the real property was necessary to further an overriding
state interest in protecting creditors from fraudulent or wrongful disposal of prop-
erty by a debtor. Second, there was a special need for very prompt action under
the circumstances of this case. Third, RCW 7.12.020(6) and (7) have been
drawn to accommodate such an extraordinary situation . . ..
84 Wn. 2d at 937, 530 P.2d at 276. The court limited its holding to an attachment
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debtor is deprived, 4' have concluded that the restrictions on real prop-
erty use imposed by an attachment lien are de minimis, amount to
little more than constructive notice that a suit for damages is pending,
and accordingly do not deprive the debtor of a constitutionally pro-
tected property interest. 42
pursuant to R.C.W. § 7.12.020(6)-(7). two of the ten grounds for attachment. See
note 19 su pra. Both of these grounds concern fraudulent disposal of assets by a debtor.
The court did not reach the constitutionality of an attachment under any of the other
eight grounds, including R.C.W. § 7.12.020(10), which authorizes an attachment to
recover on an express or implied contract. Presumably that ground. at least, would
not fit within the Fuentes concept of an extraordinary situation.
In adopting the "extraordinary situations" rationale, the court appeared to accept
the premise that an attachment of real property involves the taking of a constitu-
tionally protected property interest. Under Fuentes, the "extraordinary situation" ex-
ception was a device to permit summary seizure of protected property in limited sit-
uations where prior notice and an opportunity to be heard would otherwise be man-
dated. The court indicated in dictum, however, that even absent an extraordinary
situation it might consider ex parte attachment of real property constitutionally per-
missible. 84 Wn. 2d at 938, 530 P.2d at 276. The court purported to distinguish the
case from Fuentes under the authority of McInnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A.
699 (1928). aff'd mere., 279 U.S. 820 (1929). In McKay the Maine court held con-
stitutional the state's summary attachment statute as applied to real property. See note
22 supra. Thus, the court in DeHart appears to have taken away with one hand what
it gave with the other.
Nevertheless, both the extraordinary situations rationale and the dictum relying
upon McKay are of dubious value. Although the Washington court in DeHart did not
consider the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell, the ratification therein
of the procedural alternatives allowing summary sequestration appears to have de-
stroyed the underlying basis of "extraordinary situations" as defined in Fuentes. See
Pearson, Due Process and the Debtor: The Impact of Mitchell v. W.T. Grant (pt. 2).
29 OKIA. L. REV. 277. 309 (1976). Moreover. although it was cited with approval in
Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 613. McKay is of questionable precedential value. See Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 91 n.23. When it was decided, the Court gave greater weight
to long-established practices that have since been successfully challenged on due
process grounds. Justice Harlan, concurring in Sniadach, stated that prior notice and
an opportunity to be heard constitute the core principle of due process and declared
himself unwilling to "take the unexplicated per curiam in MVlcKay v. Mclnnes as
vitiating or diluting" those essential elements. 395 U.S. at 343-44. A careful reading
of Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 91 n.23, and cases cited therein suggests that the
Court's memorandum opinion upholding the procedural due process of attachment of
realty in McKay is now to be construed narrowly to allow attachment of realty only
when necessary to secure jurisdiction.
41. See Fuentes v. Shevin. 407 U.S. 67. 86-88 (1972): Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan. J.. concurring).
42. See, e.g., In re The Oronoka. 393 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Me. 1975) (mere re-
striction of power to alienate is not deprivation of property interest): First Recreation
Corp. v. Amoroso, 26 Ariz. App. 477. 549 P.2d 257. 260 (1976) (real property
attachment does not deprive debtor of "any significant property interest"). See also
Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's. Inc., 379 F. Supp. 997 (D. Ariz. 1973). aff'd, 417
U.S. 901 (1974) (mechanics' and materialmen's lien interferes only with "economic"
interests of debtor); Central Security Nat'l Bank v. Royal Homes, Inc., 371 F. Supp.
476 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Harrison v. Morris, 370 F. Supp. 142 (D.S.C. 1974): Black
Watch Farms v. Dick. 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971): Robinson v. Loyola
Foundation, Inc. 236 So. 2d 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (real estate attachment
is little more than constructive notice that suit for damages is pending against owner).
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II. HANSEN v. WEYERHAEUSER: "ECONOMIC INTEREST"
AND REAL PROPERTY ATTACHMENT
In an extremely brief opinion, the Ninth Circuit in Hansen v. Wey-
erhaeuser held that the creditor's attachment lien interferes with only
"economic" interests of the debtor and thus does not constitute the
taking of a property interest within the ambit of the due process
clause.43 Consequently, neither prior notice and an opportunity to be
heard nor alternative procedural guaranteeA are vital to a constitu-
tional attachment of real property pursuant to the Washington
statute.44
As the basis of its decision, the court relied upon Spielman-Fond,
Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc., as summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court.45
In Spielman-Fond the Arizona federal district court held that a me-
chanics' and materialmen's lien on real property did not deprive the
owner of a property interest cognizable under the fourteenth amend-
ment. The debtor had only an "economic interest" in retaining his
property free of mistaken or arbitrary liens. Absent a property inter-
est, the summary lien procedures provided by the Arizona statute
could not be unconstitutional. 46
After determining that the debtor in Hansen had not been deprived
of a property interest, the court concluded that it was not required to
consider the balancing approach to prejudgment remedies expressed
43. 526F.2d at 506.
44. id.
45. 379 F. Supp. 997 (D. Ariz. 1973) (per curiam), aff'd inen., 417 U.S. 901
(1974). The decision was summarily affirmed two weeks after Mitchell was decided.
The Ninth Circuit court found Spielnan-Fond closely in point, reasoning that the
effect of an attachment lien on the interests of the debtor is identical to that of a
mechanics' lien.
46. Spielman-Fond contended that the defendant's perfection of its mechanics' and
materialmen's lien without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard deprived it of
a property interest in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The court acknowledged
similarities between the challenged lien procedures and the garnishment and replevin
statutes in Sniadach and Fuentes. All three involved a dispute between private parties
and a state mechanism as the instrumentality of one party; in addition, none of the
statutes provided significant procedural safeguards against mistaken deprivation. Never-
theless, the crucial distinction remained: In both Sniadach and Fuentes the debtors
were deprived of actual possession and use of their property, whereas in Spielnan-
Fond the plaintiff retained possession and continued to rent the property. Furthermore,
although the lien made sale of the property more difficult, there was nothing in the
statute or lien prohibiting sale if a willing buyer were found. The lien did "nothing
more than impinge on economic interests of the property owner." 379 F. Supp. at 999.
The court distinguished cases upon which the plaintiff relied as reaffirming the impor-
tance of the right to freely alienate property on the ground they involved actual statu-
tory or contractual prohibitions against sale. Id.
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in Mitchell.47 The court did not discuss the due process guarantees
validated in Mitchell, except to suggest that the post-attachment
hearing provision of the Washington statute is analogous to the early
postseizure hearing provided by the Louisiana sequestration statute.48
This part critically evaluates the authority of Spielman-Fond as
precedent and challenges the reasoning of that decision, which was
adopted in Hansen v. Weyerhaeuser. It demonstrates that realty at-
tachment involves the curtailment of important property uses. It sug-
gests that the better view is that an attachment of real property de-
prives the owner of a property interest protected by the procedural
guarantees of the fourteenth amendment.
A. Spielman-Fond As Precedent
The Ninth Circuit found the summary affirmance in Spielman-
Fond controlling.49 But although a summary affirmance is a decision
on the merits, it is not an affirmance of the reasoning of the lower
opinion. 50 It is doubtful that the mechanics' lien involved in Spielman-
Fond presented sufficient legal or factual similarities to real property
attachment to warrant the application of that decision in the absence
of a full opinion by the Supreme Court.51
Indeed, one court has expressly rejected both the reasoning and the
precedential authority of Spielman-Fond while holding a mechanics'
lien statute invalid on due process grounds. In Barry Properties, Inc.
v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co.,5 2 the Maryland court observed that the
Supreme Court may have considered the Arizona mechanics' lien law
47. For a discussion of the balancing approach to prejudgment remedies formu-
lated in Mitchell, see Part I-A supra & Part III infra.
48. 526 F.2d at 506-07. For an analysis of this phase of the decision, see Part
III-A infra.
49. The court stated: "The [Supreme] Court has made it clear that a summary
affirmance of a case within its appellate jurisdiction is a decision on the merits and is
binding on the inferior federal courts until the Court tells them that it is not." 526
F.2d at 506.
50. See note 54 and accompanying text infra.
51. In the jurisdictional brief submitted by the respondent in Spielinan-Fond, dis-
cussion centered on efforts to distinguish mechanics' liens from real property attach-
ment. Respondents appeared to concede that summary attachment of real property
would be unconstitutional. However, they distinguished mechanics' liens as analogous
to a confession of judgment, citing Charleston v. Wohlgemuth, 332 F. Supp. 1175
(E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 970 (1972), and Ross v. Brown Title Co., 356 F.
Supp. 595 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 412 U.S. 934 (1973). Motion To Dismiss or Affirm at
2-5, 9.
52. 277 Md. 15. 353 A.2d 222 (1976).
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upheld in Spielman-Fond as containing procedural safeguards ade-
quately comporting with due process. 53 In rejecting the authority of
Spielman-Fond as dispositive of the issues, the court quoted Chief Jus-
tice Burger:
When [the Supreme Court] summarily affirm [s] without opinion the
judgment of a three-judge District Court [the Court] affirm [s] the
judgment but not necessarily the reasoning by which it was reached.
An unexplicated summary affirmance settles the issues for the parties,
and is not to be read as a renunciation by this Court of doctrines pre-
viously announced in our opinions after full argument. Indeed, upon
fuller consideration of an issue under plenary review, the Court has
not hesitated to discard a rule which a line of summary affirmances
may appear to establish.54
The Supreme Court in Spielman-Fond affirmed the judgment of the
Arizona district court, but it did not necessarily accept the lower
court's conclusion that a mechanics' lien invades only "economic" as
opposed to protected property interests of the debtor. Recent lower
court decisions add further support to this position. 55 In light of the
Supreme Court's expansive reading of "property interest" in past deci-
sions, 56 Spielman-Fond should be limited to its facts rather than ex-
tended to cases of real property attachment.
B. The Substantive Effect of Real Property Attachment
The Hansen court's conclusion that there was "no substantial
53. Id. at 233. Accord, Roundhouse Constr. Corp. v. Telesco Masons Supplies Co.,
168 Conn. 371, 362 A.2d 778, 783 (1975). The Roundhouse decision was vacated
and remanded by the Supreme Court for a determination of whether the decision
rested on an independent state ground, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), and the state court re-
affirmed on both state and federal grounds, 365 A.2d 393 (Conn. 1976). The court in
Barry Properties also noted the virtually identical function of the federal and state
due process clauses: "[TJ hese constitutional provisions have the same meaning and
effect in reference to an exaction of property, and the decisions of the Supreme Court
on the Fourteenth Amendment are practically direct authorities ...." 353 A.2d at
227 (quoting Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek, 272 Md. 143, 156, 321 A.2d 748,
755 (1974)).
54. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1975) (concurring opinion) (foot-
note omitted). In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974), the Court indi-
cated that summary affirmances have some minimal precedential value, but failed to
define that value.
55. See notes 70-74 and accompanying text infra. A number of courts, however,
have adopted the "economic interest" rationale of Spielman-Fond in the context of
both mechanics' liens and real property attachment. See note 69 and accompanying
text infra.
56. See notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra.
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taking of property" within the meaning of the due process clause 57 is
based on an analysis which appears to concentrate on the form rather
than on the substance of the deprivation. The Ninth Circuit character-
ization of the debtor's interest as "economic" does nothing to lessen
the impact of an attachment of real property. Such an attachment has
a number of negative effects: Until the underlying claim is decided on
its merits, an attachment impairs market value and marketability,
adversely affects credit rating, restricts the ability of the owner to
mortgage the property, and diminishes his equity to the extent of the
lien. 58 In addition, the lien may be used by the creditor for the sole
purpose of pressuring the debtor to settle out of court and to pay a
doubtful or invalid claim.59 There is little practical difference between
these restrictions and any legal or contractual prohibition against
sale. 60
Some courts have considered constitutionally significant the differ-
ence between the "hardship" imposed by actual seizure of personal
property and the less immediate and noticeable effects of an attach-
57. 526 F.2d at 506.
58. See Connolly Dev. Inc. v. Superior Court. 17 Cal. 3d 803. 813. 553 P.2d 637.
643, 132 Cal. Rptr. 477, 483 (1976), appeal di.,missed, 47 S. Ct. 778 (1977) (mem.):
Barry Properties, Inc., v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15. 353 A.2d 222. 228
(1976).
59. The leverage that may be gained by the creditor when an attachment lien is
filed is most apparent when the property owner is contemplating immediate sale. The
lien will render title "unmarketable" and may force the owner to breach the contract
of sale. The existence of title insurance will not suffice in cases where the purchase
agreement or the lender's commitment requires the owner to convey marketable title:
the purchaser or lender may justifiably object to a closing of escrow upon the owner's
tender of only an insurable title. See Hebb v. Severson. 32 Wn. 2d 159. 165-67. 201
P.2d 156. 159-60 (1948). Further, title insurance may be more costly than the amount
demanded in the attachment. In any case, the property owner is faced with only unat-
tractive alternatives-pay the creditor's claim regardless of validity and discharge the
attachment, risk breach of the land sale contract and consequent damages. or forego
the use of other assets to invest in title insurance. See Comment. Sniadach, Overmyer
and Fuentes: Problems for the Mechanics' Lien and Protection of Real Property De-
'elopers, 1973 LAW & Soc. ORD. 497, 508-10. The impact of the lien and the creditor's
resulting leverage against the debtor are particularly significant when the owner is a
developer who borrows funds to finance construction and either contemplates selling
the property or refinancing with a long-term loan. The permanent lender will require
the property to be kept free of all liens and encumbrances. If the lien is not dis-
charged, default under a construction mortgage may result and the owner may lose
everything, all on the basis of an unverified claim by the creditor. Clearly, if foreclo-
sure is the alternative, the debtor may be very receptive to a creditor's demands re-
gardless of validity. Id. at 503-04.
60. Nevertheless, in Spielman-Fond. Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc.. 379 F. Supp. 997 (D.
Ariz. 1973). aff'd, 417 U.S. 901 (1974), the district court relied upon this difference
to distinguish prior cases that had highlighted the importance of the right to freely
dispose of property. See note 46 supra.
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ment lien. 61 The negative effects of a real property attachment may
indeed impose less "hardship," because they usually arise only if the
debtor attempts to sell or mortgage the property. The same analysis,
however, applies to certain forms of personal property attachment:
the negative effects of a garnished bank account, for example, arise
only when the debtor attempts to turn his bank's promise into cash.62
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has made clear that the extent to
which the attachment process engenders immediate hardship is not
determinative of whether a property interest exists and thus whether
due process requirements should apply.63 In Sniadach the Court did
not require the debtor to show that the garnishment process produced
any abuse or hardship; it was satisfied that abuse was potential and
occurred in some cases. 64 The Court has been concerned with the
creditor's leverage and lack of accountability, not because of the type
of property involved, but as a consequence of the summary proce-
dures permitted. 65
Indeed, an attachment lien severely infringes an important incident
of property ownership---the ability of the property owner to convey or
mortgage clear title. In other contexts, the Court has stated that the
61. In Central Security Nat'l Bank v. Royal Homes, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 476 (E.D.
Mich. 1974), the court stated: "The absence of hardship is a relevant and material
factor in weighing the interests affected by the [real property] attachment." Id. at 48 1.
See also Black Watch Farms v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971).
62. See Terranova v. AVCO Financial Servs., 396 F. Supp. 1402, 1406 (D. Vt.
1975). In Hansen the opinion of the bankruptcy referee recognized this similarity:
Some argument is made of the fact that the lien by way of attachment is not
possessory and therefore does not amount to a seizure. However, there is not
much question but what the attachment involves significant interference by the
creditor with the debtor's free use of the property. While possession is one of the
incidents of ownership of real property, there are other facets which are of sub-
stantial nature; thus the attachment of real estate can restrain the owner of the
subject property from transforming it into money by sale or mortgage just as
surely as the owner of a garnished bank account is restrained from transferring
his bank's promise into cash.
In re Northwest Homes, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 725, 730 (W.D. Wash. 1973), rev'd sub
noni. Hansen v. Weyerhaeuser Co. (In re Northwest Homes, Inc.), 526 F.2d 505
(1975).
63. See note 39 supra.
64. See Smith, Sniadach and Summary Procedures: The Constitution Comes to
the Marketplace, 5 IND. L.F. 300, 310 (1972).
65. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969). In North
Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), the Court refused to
distinguish between garnishment of commercial and consumer bank accounts, de-
claring that "the probability of irreparable injury in the latter [commercial case] is
sufficiently great so that some procedures are necessary to guard against the risk of
initial error." Id. at 608. It is the probability of injury to the class of property owners
which is constitutionally relevant, not individual hardship.
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right to freely convey property is constitutionally protected. 66 The
Washington Supreme Court also has emphasized that the right to dis-
pose of property is an important protected incident of ownership.6 7
Further, it is settled that there may be an unconstitutional taking of
property even though there is no seizure and the owner is permitted
possessory use. 68
While a number of courts considering due process challenges to
state real property attachment and mechanics' lien statutes have
adopted the "economic interest" rationale of Spielman-Fond,69 signifi-
66. In Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). the Court held unconstitutional
a city ordinance mandating a block quota system which prevented a white home
owner from selling his property to a black. Of "property" the Court stated: "Property
is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it includes
the right to acquire, use and dispose of it. The Constitution protects these essential
attributes of property." Id. at 62. See also Shelley v. Kraemer. 334 U.S. 1. 10 (1948).
67. See Lange v. State. 86 Wn. 2d 585, 547 P.2d 282 (1976). The plaintiff
argued that "de facto" condemnation of his property had occurred prior to actual
condemnation because the publicity accorded a highway project had decreased the
value and marketability of the land. The court agreed: " 'Ownership' in property has
long been conceived as a 'complex of rights' including the right to use and enjoy the
thing owned and the right to consume, destroy or alienate the thing.' " Id. at 590.
547 P.2d at 285. Because of the highway project. appellants were "deprived of the
most important incidents of ownership, the rights to use and alienate property." Id. at
595, 547 P.2d at 288. See also In re Seattle. 81 Wn. 2d 652, 657. 504 P.2d 292. 295
(1972) (eminent domain proceeding in which court stated that valuable rights in land
include not only possession, but rights to rent, to sell, and to improve): Ackerman v.
Port of Seattle, 55 Wn. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960), discussed at note 68 infra.
68. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (airport use of airspace
above plaintiff's land, making residential use of property difficult and interfering with
plaintiff's health and peace of mind, was "taking" of property interest for which
county must pay compensation). See also United States v. Causby. 328 U.S. 256
(1946). In Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wn. 2d 400. 348 P.2d 664 (1960). the
plaintiffs alleged that airport use of airspace above their unimproved vacant land de-
creased its value and constituted a taking of a property interest for which just com-
pensation must be paid. The court agreed, holding that the property interest in a thing
consists not merely of its ownership and possession, but of the unrestricted right of
use, enjoyment, and disposal. Anything which destroys any of those elements to that
extent destroys the property itself. Id. at 409, 348 P.2d at 669.
69. See In re The Oronoka, 393 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Me. 1975) (Spielnan-Fond
established that restriction of power to alienate is not property interest protected by
fourteenth amendment); First Recreation Corp. v. Amoroso. 26 Ariz. App. 477. 549
P.2d 257 (1976) (real property attachment constitutionally indistinguishable from
mechanics' lien in Spielnan-Fond); Bustel v. Bustel, 555 P.2d 722. 724 (Mont. 1976)
(upholding state's summary real property attachment statute upon basis of Spielman-
Fond and Hansen decisions and rejecting holdings in United States Gen., Inc. v. Arndt.
417 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Wis. 1976), and Terranova v. AVCO Financial Servs., Inc..
396 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Vt. 1975), discussed at note 73 infra, as "resting on gauzy
and theoretical bases having little relevance to present day realities"). See also National
Permanent Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Virginia Concrete Co. (In re Thomas A. Cary.
Inc.), 412 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Va. 1976). Spielman-Fond has also been found con-
trolling as applied to mechanics' liens. See Tucker Door & Trim Corp, v. Fifteenth
Street Co., 235 Ga. 727. 221 S.E.2d 433 (1975) (holding summary mechanics' lien
procedures constitutional under authority of Spielnan-Fond and because lien statute
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cantly several courts have rejected or ignored the Spielman-Fond rea-
soning and have concluded that real property attachment entails an
invasion of property interests of the debtor that are entitled to consti-
tutional protection. In Roundhouse Construction Corp. v. Telesco
Masons Supplies Co.70 and Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros.
Roofing Co.7 1 both the Connecticut and Maryland Supreme Courts
rejected the reasoning of Spielman-Fond and held that imposition of a
mechanics' lien without notice and a prior hearing or other procedural
safeguards constitutes a taking of a significant property interest in vio-
lation of the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions.
Each court expressly disagreed with the view that, absent a seizure of
both use and physical possession, the restrictions imposed by the lien
are de minimis. The Barry Properties court recognized that the lien
makes sale or encumbrance of the property extremely difficult and
diminishes the owner's equity to the extent of the lien.72 Three federal
district courts7 3 and the California Supreme Court7 4 have adopted the
serves important public interests); Morse v. Rentar Indus. Dev. Corp., 85 Misc. 2d
304, 379 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1976). See also Brook Hollow Assocs. v. J.E. Greene, Inc.,
389 F. Supp. 1322 (D. Conn. 1975).
70. 168 Conn. 371, 362 A.2d 778, vacated and remanded for determination of
whether decision rests on independent state ground, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), reaffirmed
on both state and federal grounds, 365 A.2d 393 (Conn. 1976).
71. 277-Md. 15, 353 A.2d 222 (1976).
72. 353A.2d at 228.
73. See United States Gen., Inc. v. Arndt, 417 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Wis. 1976);
Terranova v. AVCO Financial Servs., Inc., 396 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Vt. 1975); Hutch-
ison v. Bank of North Carolina, 392 F. Supp. 888 (M.D.N.C. 1975). All three
courts simply ignored the decision in Spielman-Fond. The district court in Arndt
held the Wisconsin statute constitutionally deficient for permitting the attachment of
real property solely upon a conclusory supporting affidavit and without requiring
adequate bond or providing the debtor with a sufficient opportunity to obtain immediate
post-attachment relief from wrongful issuance of the writ. 417 F. Supp. at 1312-13.
The district court in Terranova held Vermont's attachment statute unconstitutional
under the due process clause as applied to real property, stating that an attachment
of real estate curtails economically important property uses. 396 F. Supp. at 1407. In
Hutchison the court concluded at the outset that the procedural requirements of due
process are applicable to an attachment.of real property. 392 F. Supp. at 894. The
court upheld the statute, which allowed summary attachment of plaintiff's condo-
minium, not because the attachment of real property does not infringe on a property
interest, but because the statute contained the procedural safeguards held necessary
in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). See note 89 infra.
74. Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 803, 533 P.2d 637, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 477 (1976), appeal dismissed, 97 S. Ct. 778 (1977) (mem.). The court held
that the filing of a mechanics' lien constitutes a "taking" of a constitutionally protected
property interest. It favorably cited Roundhouse and Barry Properties while expressly
disagreeing with the Spielman-Fond holding in this regard. Id. at 812-13, 553 P.2d at
642-44, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 482-83. Nevertheless, the court upheld California's mechanics'
lien statute as not violative of the due process clause, noting that it actually provided
more procedural safeguards than did the Arizona statute upheld in Spielman-Fond.
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same reasoning. These courts have aligned themselves with the nu-
merous pre-1974 decisions that the attachment of realty involves dep-
rivation of a property interest cognizable under the fourteenth amend-
ment.75 Despite the holding in Hansen v. Weyerhaeuser, the Wash-
ington court should follow the reasoning of these courts, whose anal-
ysis reflects a better understanding of the nature and effects of real
property attachment.76
III. THE INTERESTS BALANCED
A. The Constitutional Deficiency of the Attachment Statute
The Hansen court suggested that even if it had found a deprivation
of a significant property interest, the Washington attachment statute
would withstand a due process challenge. The court stated that the
post-attachment hearing afforded the debtor compared favorably with
the immediate postseizure hearing provided by the statute upheld in
Mitchell.77 The court did not elaborate on this observation. Neverthe-
less, this part of the note demonstrates that the Washington provision
for a post-attachment hearing fails to meet the constitutional requi-
sites expressed in Mitchell and subsequent cases.
The Supreme Court in Mitchell held that a statute authorizing pre-
judgment seizure of a debtor's property may contain adequate proce-
dural safeguards which comport with due process requirements even
though it does not mandate prior notice and a hearing. The Court sus-
tained the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute which afforded the
following procedural guarantees: (1) A requirement that the creditor
allege specific facts in support of summary seizure; (2) judicial super-
vision of the writ-issuing process; (3) filing . a bond by the creditor;
75. See, e.g., Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n v. PPG Indus..
365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973); Clement v. Four North State Street Corp.. 360
F. Supp. 993 (D.N.H. 1973).
76. For a discussion of what the Washington court has stated with regard to this
matter, see note 40 supra.
77. The court stated:
Since the Louisiana sequestration statute in Mitchell entitled the debtor to an
immediate hearing at which the creditor had the burden of justifying the issuance
of the writ, the Court concluded that the challenged procedure comported with
due process.
Washington also provides for an early hearing at which the creditor is required
to demonstrate that the writ was properly and regularly issued. See. RCW 7.12.270.
526 F.2d at 506-07.
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and (4) the right of the debtor to an immediate postseizure hearing
and to dissolution of the writ absent proof by the creditor of the prob-
able validity of the merits of the underlying claim.78 The Court clearly
regarded the postseizure hearing essential to due process, as ensuring
an early determination of error and enabling the debtor to minimize
harmful consequences of a mistaken or arbitrary seizure.7
9
One year later in Di-Chem, the Court held unconstitutional a gar-
nishment statute that lacked any procedural guarantees similar to
those which had "saved" the sequestration statute in Mitchell.80 The
absence of an early postseizure hearing at which the creditor would be
required to demonstrate the probable validity of his claim was cited
by the Court as a significant defect in the statute.81 Two lower federal
courts have since held that a statutory post-attachment hearing which
does not allow the merits of the creditor's claim to be put in issue fails
to meet minimal due process requirements under Mitchell.82
The relevant Washington statutory provision, R.C.W. § 7.12.270,
suffers from a similar constitutional defect. The post-attachment
hearing does not reach the merits of the underlying claim. The debtor
78. 416 U.S. at 605-06.
79. The Court stated: "[T] he debtor may immediately have a full hearing on the
matter of possession following the execution of the writ, thus cutting to a bare
minimum the time of creditor- or court-supervised possession." Id. at 6 10.
80. The Court stated that "[t] he Georgia garnishment statute has none of the
saving characteristics of the Louisiana statute." 419 U.S. at 607.
8 I. ld. The Court stated: 'There is no provision for an early hearing at which
the creditor would be required to demonstrate at least probable cause for the garnish-
ment." Justice Powell, concurring, stated: 'The most compelling deficiency in the
Georgia procedure is its failure to provide a prompt and adequate postgarnishment
hearing." Id. at 613.
82. See United States Gen., Inc. v. Arndt, 417 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Wis. 1976);
Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds sub nomn. Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73 (1976). The court in Arndt wasted
little time in pinpointing the deficiency:
[T] he Wisconsin statute specifically precludes judicial consideration of a plaintiff's
likelihood of success on the merits of the claim underlying the attachment ....
Such an unequivocal elimination of consideration of the plaintiff's underlying
claim on a challenge to the writ renders the process afforded therein deficient.
417 F. Supp. at 1313. In Sugar the district court had relied on early decisions by the
New York courts that appeared to preclude an inquiry into the merits on a motion to
dissolve an attachment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the
district court with directions to abstain from a decision on the federal constitutional
issue until the parties had an opportunity to obtain a construction from the state courts
of the prejudgment attachment statute. The Court noted that, although early case law
agreed with the district court's conclusion, recent case law indicated that New York
courts had considered a wide range of grounds, including fact issues going to the merits
of the creditor's claim. Because the question of how the state courts would construe
the statute was unclear, it was improper for a three-judge district court to address the
question of the statute's constitutionality.
785
Washington Law Review Vol. 52: 767, 1977
is authorized to seek dissolution of the attachment only upon grounds
that it was improperly or irregularly issued. Neither an allegation by
the debtor of the nonexistence of any legal indebtedness or of any
contractual obligation, nor the introduction of any defense by way of
counterclaim or setoff, constitutes a valid ground for dissolution of
the writ. 83 Thus, the hearing tests only the capacity of the creditor to
follow the procedures delineated in the statute, not the probable va-
lidity of the underlying debt. It does nothing to minimize the possi-
bility of a wrongful attachment or use of the lien solely to gain le-
verage over the debtor. The statute does require the creditor to post a
bond as security for any damages sustained by the debtor in the event
of a wrongful attachment, 84 but it requires neither specific factual alle-
gations in support of the writ nor judicial supervision of the writ-
issuing process, both of which the Mitchell Court also considered to
be critical guarantees. Contrary to the conclusion of the Ninth Circuit
in Hansen, Washington's attachment statute fails to meet the constitu-
83. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.12.270 (1976) states:
The defendant may at any time after he has appeared in the action and before he
has given bond to the effect that he will perform the judgment of the court, as pro-
vided in RCW 7.12.250, apply on motion, upon reasonable notice to the plaintiff.
to the court in which the action is brought or to the judge thereof, that the writ of
attachment be discharged on the ground that the same was improperly or irregu-
larly issued.
"Improperly or irregularly issued" includes consideration of the ground under R.C.W.
§ 7.12.020 (1976) upon which the writ of attachment was issued. For example, in
Hogue v. McAllister, 122 Wash. 347, 210 P. 671 (1922), the plaintiff brought suit
on a claim attaching personal property of the defendant and alleging under R.C.W.
§ 7.12.020(7) that the defendant was preparing to convert his property into money
to place it beyond the reach of his creditors. The defendant was able to controvert
that allegation by affidavit in a post-attachment hearing, and the writ was dissolved.
This does not mean, however, that the defendant could attack the purported debt or
present any defenses tending to show that the plaintiff would fail to prove his claim
at the trial. For example, if the ground upon which the attachment was issued is
R.C.W. § 7.12.020(10)-to recover on a contract express or implied-the defendant
can introduce no evidence controverting that allegation since the existence of the
contract necessarily goes to the merits of the plaintiff's claim, and evidence of the
merits of the claim is not admissible under Washington case law. See McFarland v.
Ratcliffe. 167 Wash. 673, 9 P.2d 1090 (1932); Market Operating Corp. v. Crull, 165
Wash. 306, 5 P.2d 340 (1931).
It should be noted, however, that this issue has not been before the Washington
Supreme Court recently. Consequently, old case law may not be definitive, as was
the case in Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73 (1976). See note 82 supra. Due process ob-
jections to the Washington post-attachment hearing would largely disappear should
the court construe "improperly or irregularly issued" to include issues reaching the
probable validity of the creditor's underlying claim.
84. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.12.060 (1976). The creditor must post a bond for
double the amount for which he demands judgment as security for damages in the
event the defendant may prove that the attachment was "wrongfully, oppressively or
maliciously sued out." Id.
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tional requisites delineated in Mitchell and applied in subsequent
cases.
B. A Need for the "Mitchell Model" in Real Property Attachment
The procedural guarantees sanctioned by the Court in Mitchell, if
applied to real property attachment, would serve to give the process
an enhanced measure of accuracy and reliability while preserving the
interest of the creditor in the property attached.8 5 A creditor seeking
security in an attachment of real property will find his interests pro-
tected to some extent by the nature of the property itself. The chief
concern of the Court in Mitchell was that the prior notice and hearing
requirement of Fuentes,8 6 as applied to personalty, would expose the
creditor to a serious risk of loss through concealment, destruction,
encumbrance, transfer, or depreciation of the property.87 A creditor
seeking to attach real property, however, faces significantly less risk
that the property will be destroyed or undergo measurable deprecia-
tion. Nor can the property be concealed or removed from the jurisdic-
tion. Moreover, in Washington, if a conveyance is fraudulent the cred-
itor may still reach the property while in the hands of the grantee by
attachment or an action to set aside the conveyance. 88
85. The Court in Mitchell rejected the Fuentes rule that balancing is never ap-
propriate as an initial matter and only applicable in the narrow realm of an "extra-
ordinary situation." Some commentators, however, have concluded on the basis of
Mitchell and Di-Chemn that prior notice and an opportunity to be heard-the Fuentes
requirements-are constitutionally required in the context of unsecured transactions
and that the alternative procedures in Mitchell are available only to a creditor with a
secured interest in the property seized. See Comment, Justice White's Chemistry: The
Mitchellization of Fuentes, 50 WASH. L. REV. 901 (1975). Others have concluded
that despite the apparent revitalization of Fuentes in Di-Chemn, the former was and
still is overruled by Mitchell insofar as it was inconsistent. Thus, the nature of the
creditor's interest in the property is not determinative. See Pearson, supra note 40, at
277-78. The Supreme Court's decision in Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73 (1976), would
appear to indicate support for this latter view. The Court remanded for reconsideration
of the post-attachment hearing requirement although the creditor had no secured
interest in the property attached. See note 82 supra.
86. See notes 25-26 and accompanying text supra.
87. 416 U.S. 608-10. For a critical analysis of the practical validity of Justice
White's concern for the creditor's interests in Mitchell, see Pearson, supra note 26.
For commentary challenging the efficacy of either the Fuentes or Mitchell due process
requirements, see Scott, supra note 13.
88. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.40.090 (1976). To the extent that the grantee gives
consideration and is without actual fraudulent intent, he is entitled to a lien or to
retain the property as security for consideration paid. Id. § 19.40.090(3). See
Masterson v. Ogden, 78 Wash. 644, 139 P. 654 (1914) (awarding plaintiff lien against
property fraudulently transferred by her ex-husband to avoid payment of divorce
settlement).
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The Mitchell model further promotes the creditor's interest by al-
lowing him to attach realty without prior notice to the debtor. The
creditor retains fully the element of "surprise"; the debtor, not warned
of any pending action, will have no opportunity to respond by placing
the property beyond the creditor's reach.
Indeed, the principal function of the procedural guarantees of
Mitchell is to ensure that unwarranted deprivation is kept to a min-
imum by holding the creditor accountable for his actions. Judicial
supervision of the writ-issuing process adds nothing to the creditor's
risk, nor does any requirement that the creditor allege the specific fac-
tual basis of his claim. An immediate post-attachment hearing at
which the creditor must prove the probable validity of his claim oper-
ates to protect the debtor against mistaken attachment and minimize
interference with his free use of the property. A creditor who cannot
demonstrate the probable validity of his claim should not be entitled
to utilize state resources to interfere with the debtor's use of his prop-
erty.
To the extent that Mitchell-by requiring a bond, specific factual
allegations, judicial supervision of the writ-issuing process, and an
immediate postseizure hearing-would reduce the likelihood that the
debtor would be deprived of the unfettered use of real property
without justification, it is a decision that promotes the interests of the
debtor that are entitled to constitutional protection. 89 If applied to
real property attachment, these alternative procedures would serve to
give attachment an enhanced measure of accuracy and reliability
while preserving the interest of the creditor in the property attached.
The Washington attachment statute should be amended to conform to
these essential due process requirements.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision of the Ninth Circuit in Hansen v. Weyerhaeuser
89. In Hutchison v. Bank of North Carolina, 392 F. Supp. 888 (M.D.N.C. 1975)
the court used precisely this kind of flexible due process test under which the magni-
tude and probability of the harm to the debtor were balanced against the interests of
the state in providing creditors with effective collection remedies. The overriding con-
cern of the Court in Mitchell, the district court believed. was to consider the effective-
ness of the challenged statute in minimizing the risk that the ex parte procedure would
lead to a wrongful taking. The court concluded the procedural safeguards present in
the North Carolina real property attachment statute, closely following those present
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should not be followed in Washington. Its purported distinction be-
tween the attachment of real and personal property ignores the actual
effects of the former by focusing on the form rather than on the sub-
stance of the deprivation. A court holding that real property attach-
ment is within the ambit of due process protection would necessarily
require a declaration that the Washington attachment statute is un-
constitutional, as it fails to meet three of the four minimum standards
set forth in Mitchell. It is strongly recommended that the Washington
legislature move to amend the statute to conform to due process re-
quirements. The statute has remained essentially unchanged since
1900. It has been declared unconstitutional as applied to personal
property.9 0 There exists a genuine need for a complete reworking of
the statute to afford a clear guide to permissible procedures and
grounds for attachment of real or personal property. Absent defined
standards, neither creditors nor debtors have a definitive basis upon
which to determine whether constitutionally adequate procedures
have been followed. Furthermore, an attachment in violation of the
debtor's due process rights may subject the creditor to liability for
civil rights damages.9 1 Appropriate legislation would provide consist-
ency, delineate rights and remedies, and preserve the interest of the
creditor in the attached property, while simultaneously protecting the
interest of the debtor in preventing an erroneous or unwarranted
taking.
Deborah Elvins
in the Louisiana sequestration statute in Mitchell, adequately protected both debtor
and creditor interests.
90. See note 31 supra.
91. In Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1975), the plaintiff brought
a class action suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that class
members' constitutional rights were impaired by the Connecticut prejudgment attach-
ment and garnishment statutes, which did not provide prior notice and a hearing
before seizure of the debtor's property. The district court had dismissed the action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court refused to distinguish between
personal liberties and proprietary rights in an action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970), stating:
Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property
without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel
is, in truth, a "personal" right, whether the "property" in question be a welfare
check, a home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists
between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property .... That
rights in property are basic civil rights has long been recognized.
405 U.S. at 552.
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